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Abstract 
We analyze the impact of Election Day alcohol bans on road traffic accidents, traffic-related injuries, 
and alcohol-related hospitalizations. Our analysis focuses on the 2012 Municipal Elections in Brazil, 
during which 11 out of 27 states imposed on its 2,733 municipalities the decision to implement alcohol 
bans. Using daily-level data on municipalities, we find that alcohol bans caused substantial reductions 
in road crashes (15%), traffic-related injuries (30-70%), and traffic-related hospital admissions (18%). 
An analysis of the hospitalization costs associated with traffic accidents reveals that banning the sale 
of alcohol saved Brazil’s healthcare system $150,000 per day, which is likely to be a lower bound of 
the total societal cost savings. Using this figure as a benchmark, we estimate the total cost savings to 
be up to $1 million for a one-day ban on alcohol. 
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Alcohol, ban, election, drunk driving, traffic accident, road crash, hospitalization, hospital admission, 
cost analysis. 
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I. Introduction 
Road traffic injuries are a major public health problem. Every year, about 1.24 
million people die from injuries sustained in road traffic accidents and between 20 and 
50 million suffer from non-fatal injuries. Remarkably, 92% of traffic-related deaths 
occur in low and middle income countries, despite the fact that these countries account 
for only 53% of the world’s registered vehicles (World Health Organization, 2013). 
Among the countries that are afflicted with road traffic safety problems, Brazil ranks 
among the worst. Compared with the U.S., for example, fatalities from road traffic 
crashes as a fraction of all causes of death are nearly twice as high in Brazil (Sivak and 
Schoettle, 2014). The economic cost associated with these road crashes is substantial. A 
recent study estimated that, in 1997, they were valued at about $15.6 billion or about 
2% of Brazil’s gross national product (Jacobs et al., 2000).  
 The consumption of alcohol significantly impairs the driving ability of most 
individuals (Breitmeier et al., 2007; Phillips and Brewer, 2011), and one of the most 
important causes of traffic accidents is driving under the influence of alcohol (Levitt 
and Porter, 2001).
1
 For example, a recent study of traffic accidents in four state capitals 
in Brazil found that 27% of the individuals involved in road crashes had blood alcohol 
content (BAC) levels that were above the BAC limit set by the federal government 
(Galduróz and Caetano, 2006). However, while there is a consensus regarding the 
existence of a strong relationship between alcohol consumption on the one hand, and 
road crashes and traffic-related injuries on the other, much less is known about policies 
                                                          
1
 According to data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in 2011 about 
31% of all traffic fatalities in the U.S. involved at least one driver or non-occupant (such as a pedestrian 
or cyclist) with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 g/dL or higher. Similar patterns have been 
documented in several other countries (Christophersen et al., 1995; Akgür et al., 2011). According to 
Smith (1990), studies typically find that between 40 to 50% of all road traffic fatalities are associated with 
elevated blood alcohol concentrations. 
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that are effective in reducing the negative externalities associated with excessive alcohol 
consumption.  
This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating a policy that eleven 
Brazilian states imposed on its 2,733 municipalities during the 2012 Municipal 
Elections, namely, a ban on the sale and purchase of alcoholic beverages. In particular, 
we analyze the effects of short-term alcohol bans on (1) road crashes and traffic-related 
injuries and (2) alcohol-related hospital admissions and the costs associated with them. 
We exploit the fact that Brazilian federal states are allowed to independently decide 
whether to impose alcohol bans on election days. Importantly, the electoral “dry laws”, 
as these resolutions are often referred to, are intended to be a cautionary measure aimed 
at preserving public order during elections and are unrelated to any public health 
objective in Brazil. 
The analysis uses daily-level data on Brazilian municipalities from two sources. 
The first source of data is the Sistema de Informações Hospitalares (SIH-SUS), which is 
provided by Brazil's Ministry of Health and contains detailed information on about 80% 
of all hospitalizations that occur each year in Brazil. A prominent feature of this data set 
is that we observe the costs of hospital admissions, which allows us to quantify the 
extent to which bans on alcohol sales reduce the negative externalities due to excessive 
alcohol consumption, as measured by the financial burden placed on the healthcare 
system in Brazil. The second source of data comes from Brazil’s Federal Road Police 
Department, which provides information on all traffic accidents that occurred on federal 
roads.  
Our analysis reveals that, Election Day alcohol bans, which occurred over a 
weekend, substantially reduced road crashes, injuries resulting from road traffic 
accidents, and traffic-related hospitalizations. In particular, we estimate that, on 
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average, weekend bans on alcohol sales reduced road crashes by 15%, non-fatal traffic-
related injuries by 30-35%, and traffic fatalities by almost 70%. Consistent with the 
analysis of data on road crashes, we find that weekend alcohol bans caused a reduction 
of 18% in hospital admissions due to road traffic accidents. 
An analysis of hospitalization cost data reveals that, even for a short-term 
restriction on access to alcoholic beverages, the negative externality associated with 
excessive alcohol consumption is substantial. In particular, using the cost data in the 
hospitalization files, we estimate that, on average, weekend alcohol bans reduced the 
costs associated with traffic-related hospitalizations by about $50, which represents a 
40% reduction from the sample mean. Summing this value across the 2,733 
municipalities that banned alcohol during the municipal elections, our analysis indicates 
that the alcohol bans saved Brazil’s public healthcare system approximately $150,000 
on Election Day. Given that driving and traffic congestion tends to intensify during 
special events and holidays, our analysis has important policy implications, especially in 
areas where excessive alcohol consumption and risky behavior are rampant.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on 
the link between alcohol availability and public health. Second, we provide a historical 
account of Election Day alcohol bans in Brazil. Third, we describe the data used in the 
analysis. Fourth, we outline the empirical strategy and discuss the main results. Fifth, 
we explore heterogeneity in the impact of alcohol bans and the timing of its effects on 
traffic-related outcomes. Sixth, we conduct a cost analysis to quantify the magnitude of 
our estimates. Finally, we conclude.  
II. Literature Review  
The present paper is related to studies that have analyzed the impact of policies 
that either restrict or increase the availability of alcohol on public health outcomes.  
3
According to conventional wisdom, policies that restrict the sale and purchase of 
alcohol during certain hours and days of the week should lead to a reduction in risky 
behavior, accompanied by an improvement in health-related outcomes, such as a 
decrease in road traffic accidents and alcohol-related injuries.  
However, the public health impact of policies that reduce the availability of 
alcohol hinges on how sensitive individuals are to the full price of alcohol which, in 
addition to the dollar cost of the beverage itself, involves an increase in the time and 
travel costs associated with obtaining alcohol (Jewell and Brown, 1995). And, indeed, 
existing evidence on the link between access to alcohol and risky health behavior is 
mixed. For example, Heaton (2012) found no evidence that the legalization of Sunday 
packaged liquor sales in Virginia had an impact on arrests for drunk driving. Similarly, 
Norström and Skog (2005) found only weak evidence that Saturday openings of alcohol 
retail shops in Sweden increased drunk driving.
 
Lovenheim and Steefel (2010), 
analyzing a panel of U.S. states between 1990 and 2009, showed that state-level Sunday 
alcohol law repeals had, at most, a small effect on fatal road traffic accidents.
2
 
Biderman et al. (2010) found that the effect of the adoption of “dry laws” in the São 
Paulo Metropolitan Area in Brazil, such as mandatory night closing times for bars and 
restaurants, had a small and statistically insignificant effect on deaths associated with 
road crashes. In contrast, Green et al. (2014) found that road crashes actually fell after 
the liberalization of bar hours in England and Wales, by reducing the incentive for 
individuals to drink to “beat the clock” before closing times.  
Evidence from these studies, on balance, indicates that policies that constrain the 
availability of alcohol are either ineffective or have, at best, a small impact on road 
                                                          
2
 While McMillan and Lapham (2006) found that repealing the ban on Sunday packaged alcohol sales 
increased alcohol-related road crashes in New Mexico, Stehr (2010) analyzed data from several states and 
did not find that the repeal had a similar effect in other states.  
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traffic accidents. Conceptually, it is not clear whether temporary alcohol bans will have 
a favorable impact on public health outcomes. First, individuals who would like to 
consume alcohol during the time of the ban may simply purchase their beverages in 
advance and drink at home or at other private places.
3
 Moreover, as discussed by 
Vingilis (2007) and Green et al. (2014), the adoption of dry laws and other restrictions 
on closing times may lead to binge drinking shortly before licensed establishments 
close, which could perversely increase the number of intentional and unintentional 
injuries associated with excessive alcohol consumption. Also important, particularly in 
the context of a large developing country like Brazil, is the fact that some commercial 
establishments (e.g. small bars in the outskirts of towns), may have an incentive to keep 
operating despite alcohol sale restrictions, given the limited resources available for the 
police authorities to enforce the law and, consequently, the relatively small probability 
of being caught and fined. 
  The evidence cited above is mixed, but a consistent result in the literature is that 
alcohol-related policies tend to be more effective among the youth. For example, while 
Lovenheim and Steefel (2010) found that, overall, Sunday alcohol law repeals had a 
small impact on fatal road crashes, they found evidence of much larger effects on the 
fatal accident rates of underage male drivers. Marcus and Siedler (2013) found that the 
introduction of a ban on alcohol sales between 10pm and 5am at off-premises outlets in 
the German state of Baden-Württemberg reduced alcohol-related hospitalizations 
among adolescents and young adults by about 9%. Dee (1999) found that, in the U.S., a 
higher minimum legal drinking age reduces fatal traffic accidents by at least 9%. 
Similarly, Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) found a 14% increase in deaths due to motor 
vehicle accidents in the discontinuity around the minimum drinking age in the U.S., 
                                                          
3
 Interestingly, there is evidence that restrictions on smoking in public places have perverse effects on 
children. For example, Adda and Cornaglia (2010) found that, in the U.S., smoking bans displace smokers 
to private places where they expose nonsmokers to second-hand smoke.  
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while Conover and Scrimgeour (2013), using a difference-in-differences approach, also 
found a significant increase in alcohol-related hospitalizations for the group of 
individuals above the minimum age to purchase alcohol in New Zealand.  
Evidence in the literature also indicates that the day of the week that alcohol 
availability is restricted is important for policy effectiveness. For example, 
Ragnarsdóttir et al. (2002) showed that the adoption of unrestricted alcohol serving 
hours in Iceland increased admissions to emergency rooms by 20% during weekends, 
but decreased them by 2% during weekdays. And Vingilis et. al. (2005) found evidence 
that, in Ontario, people who go out to drink on weekdays are likely “problem drinkers” 
who drink until closing hours, while those that go out on weekdays are “social 
drinkers”. This has clear implications for policy effectiveness if, for example, alcohol-
related harm to society is caused mostly by the subset of the population that is most 
responsive to alcohol-related policies.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the public health effects of policies 
that restrict access to alcohol may vary by the type of policy and the age group of the 
individuals who are affected by it. While the literature reveals a mixed bag of evidence, 
it does highlight the importance of heterogeneity in the effects of policies that restrict 
access to alcohol on health outcomes. As we discuss in greater detail below, we use 
previous evidence in the literature to guide our analysis, and we explore heterogeneity 
in the impact of alcohol bans by age, sex, and the timing of the policy’s implementation.  
It is important to discuss how our paper differs from other studies in the 
literature. First, it is important to note that government authorities tend to implement a 
set of alcohol-related policies, which makes it difficult to measure the causal impact of 
any one of these policies (e.g. see Ruhm, 1996).
4
 A noteworthy difference between our 
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 For instance, the World Health Organization’s recommended policy to reduce road traffic mortality is 
based on the adoption of comprehensive legislation aimed at: (i) reducing driving speed, (ii) reducing 
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study and many of the studies in the literature is the fact that the potential for policy 
endogeniety to be a concern is extremely limited. As we discuss in greater detail below, 
we focus on a 35-day time interval, and no other alcohol-related policies were 
implemented over this period.  
Second, the policies that are evaluated in previous studies are often much less 
restrictive than the one we study here. For example, some of the policies discussed 
above apply to a subset of beverage types (liquor but not beer and wine), a subset of the 
population (young but not old), or a subset of establishments (on-premises but not off-
premises). The policy we evaluate in this study applies to all alcoholic beverages (beer, 
wine, and spirits), all consumers, all establishments (bars, restaurants, and 
supermarkets) and, in addition, the law prohibits the public consumption of alcoholic 
beverages legally purchased at other times. This distinction is important because 
previous work has shown that the effects of alcohol-related policies on traffic-related 
outcomes are varied, depending on whether the policy change involves a restriction on 
the place where the alcohol is to be consumed or the type of alcohol whose sale is 
restricted (e.g. Baughman et al., 2001). 
Third, we do not have to rely solely on back-of-the envelope calculations to 
quantify the negative externalities associated with excessive alcohol consumption. We 
exploit the richness of our hospitalization data to analyze the effect of alcohol bans on 
hospitalization costs which, as we describe in greater detail below, are likely to be close 
to the lower bound of the total costs that excessive alcohol consumption imposes on 
society. However, before moving to the analysis, we provide a background to Election 
Day alcohol bans in Brazil. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
drunk driving, (iii) increasing motorcycle helmet use, (iv) increasing seat-belt use and (v) increasing the 
use of child restraints (World Health Organization, 2013).    
7
III. Institutional Background 
A unique feature of Brazil's electoral system is that states are allowed to 
independently decide whether to impose alcohol bans on election days. Formally, there 
is no federal law regulating this issue but, in practice, state police departments and 
judges have autonomy to decide whether or not to impose alcohol bans. The electoral 
“dry laws”, as these resolutions are often referred to, prohibit the sale and purchase of 
any type of alcoholic beverage in all commercial establishments, including bars, 
restaurants, and supermarkets. As a result, these bans are much more restrictive than 
similar measures adopted in other countries, such as the Sunday liquor laws in the US.  
The rationale for the existence of electoral dry laws in Brazil is that they help the 
police to maintain public order during Election Day, by reducing the likelihood of 
violent confrontations between supporters of different local political factions as well as 
other smaller occurrences, such as decreasing the probability that individuals come to 
the polling stations under the influence of alcohol. Indeed, electoral violence is an 
important and long-unresolved issue in Brazil, especially in the poorer and less 
developed regions of the North and Northeast. For instance, during the municipal 
elections of 2012, there are reports that at least 22 politicians were murdered in the 
months preceding Election Day.
5
  
Furthermore, according to many electoral courts, cases of violence involving 
campaigners of rival candidates are frequent. As a result, in the 2012 elections, more 
than 400 municipalities requested additional police forces from the federal government 
to preserve the public order during Election Day. For the purpose of our analysis, it is, 
therefore, important to bear in mind that electoral dry laws are primarily a police issue, 
and are not at all related to any public health objective in Brazil. 
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 Barbassa, J. 2012. “Brazil: 22 Murders Connected to Local Elections.” Associated Press, September 3. 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/brazil-22-murders-connected-local-elections. 
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Historically, alcohol bans were adopted uniformly across the country in elections 
after the re-democratization in the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s. During this period, 
however, there was a gradual increase in the opposition to such restrictions, led 
especially by associations of bar and restaurant owners. These groups questioned the 
constitutional validity and effectiveness of dry laws on two main grounds. First, from a 
legal point of view, it was argued that state authorities, such as local judges and police, 
are not allowed to impose constraints on civil liberties without congressional approval. 
Second, it was claimed that, although the bans caused a significant loss in revenue for 
businesses, their impact on public safety was, at best, marginal, given that the police 
have other more effective ways to maintain order. 
In a lawsuit filed by the Brazilian Association of Bars and Restaurants (Abrasel) 
in the state of São Paulo, the association estimated the loss in revenue due to the 
adoption of a one-day ban in the city of São Paulo alone to be at around $15 million (or 
35 million Reais) in 2006. This sum corresponds to approximately 30% of the total 
revenue of bars and restaurants on a typical Sunday. After a long and protracted judicial 
battle, the lawsuit was eventually settled in favor of Abrasel and, as a result, the state of 
São Paulo has not adopted dry laws since 2008. Indeed, between 2005 and 2010, there 
were a number of similar lawsuits in different parts of the country. The final rulings in 
these cases were varied, reflecting both differences in the individual views of judges, as 
well as the specific socioeconomic and political characteristics of each state. 
Importantly, these lawsuits had the effect of sparking a public debate on electoral dry 
laws, which many people viewed as arbitrary, particularly in the more urban centers. As 
a consequence, several states were either obliged or voluntarily decided to restrain from 
imposing Election Day bans, while a few others decided to transfer the authority to 
restrict alcohol or not to municipalities. 
9
IV. Data 
The present paper uses information on the adoption of dry laws in the mayoral 
elections of 2012, which we have compiled from official reports provided by regional 
electoral courts, as well as various media sources.
6
 One part of the analysis uses data on 
4,728 municipalities—which amounts to more than 85% of the country’s total 
population—located in the 17 states that imposed statewide decisions on their 
municipalities over the banning of alcohol on Election Day.
7
 Table 1a provides 
summary statistics for the municipalities in our full sample, as well as being conditional 
on whether or not they adopted a ban on alcohol. Note that, on average, municipalities 
that implemented dry laws tend to be poorer and less developed. Furthermore, they are 
more likely to request federal police reinforcement for Election Day, suggesting that 
these places tend to be more prone to electoral violence. The duration of the bans varied 
slightly across states, but they typically lasted from 12am to 6pm on Election Day.
8
 
There are several reasons that make the 2012 elections particularly suitable for 
our study. First, in 2012, there was a fair amount of cross-sectional variation in the 
adoption of dry laws, which is crucial for our identification strategy. Second, and 
equally important, after a period of judicial uncertainty, the 2012 elections were the first 
in several years where there was sufficient clarity about which states would and would 
not implement alcohol bans. Indeed, in previous years, there were cases, such as in 
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 The main source of the information can be obtained here: http://www.ebc.com.br/noticias/eleicoes-
2012/2012/10/quais-estados-adotaram-a-lei-seca-nas-eleicoes-2012, accessed on June 3, 2014. 
7
 In 2012, elections were held on Sunday, October 7th. Overall, 11 states adopted alcohol bans 
(Amazonas, Ceará, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, 
Paraná and Rio Grande do Norte), while 6 states did not impose any restriction on alcohol consumption 
and sales (Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Rondônia, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo). 
Additionally, there were 9 states that decentralized the decision to ban alcohol to its municipalities. We 
do not include these states in our analysis because we are unable to recover information on exactly which 
municipalities implemented bans in these states. See Appendix Tables 1a and 1b for details.  
8
 The main exception was the state of Maranhão, where partial-time bans started taking place almost five 
days before the election. 
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Pernambuco and Espirito Santo in 2010, where the final decision about the ban was 
confirmed by the state’s electoral court on the day before the elections took place. We 
choose not to use data from previous years given that the lack of certainty could affect 
the results of analyses of the previous year’s data to the extent that some individuals, for 
the fear of being fined, could have refrained from consuming or selling alcohol even in 
states that ended up not imposing any restriction on these activities.
9
 
In order to analyze the impact of alcohol bans on public health, we exploit a 
unique data set from the Sistema de Informações Hospitalares (SIH-SUS) of Brazil's 
Ministry of Health, which contains detailed information on about 80% of all 
hospitalizations that occur every year in Brazil. Crucial to our study, the SIH-SUS 
reports information on the calendar day and location of each hospitalization. This 
feature allows us to pin down all hospitalizations that occurred on Election Day, as well 
as to compare the number of admissions across municipalities. The data set also 
contains information on the primary and secondary causes of each hospitalization 
(coded according to the ICD-10 code classification), which allows us to concentrate our 
analysis on the more pertinent occurrences, such as “acute” alcohol-related 
hospitalizations, which include road traffic accidents, unintentional injuries, and 
intentional injuries such as assaults.
10
 We also observe several other relevant variables, 
such as the gender and age of the patient, as well as the cost and duration of hospital 
stays. 
Our sample is constructed by aggregating the number of hospitalizations by 
calendar day and municipality for the 35-day period between September, 23
rd
 and 
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 Also, we focus our analysis on the main Election Day, and not on the runoff elections that occurred on 
October 28
th
 in a small number of municipalities. In fact, only 23 municipalities banned alcohol during 
the runoff elections, and given that they are distantly distributed across the country, the potential for 
avoidance behavior was very high. 
10
 Please see Appendix Table 2 for a list of the ICD-10 codes that were used for the main analysis, which 
was obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
11
October, 27
th
.
11
 This results in a balanced panel with 165,480 municipality-day 
observations. Table 1a shows summary statistics including average hospitalization rates 
for municipality-days for several causes. Municipalities that adopted alcohol bans over 
the sample period tend to have fewer “acute” and “chronic” alcohol-related 
hospitalizations, but have a slightly greater number of hospitalizations due to road 
traffic accidents per 100,000 persons in the municipality.  
In order to further investigate whether alcohol bans have an impact on the 
number of traffic accidents and injuries resulting from these accidents, we use a data set 
provided by Brazil’s Federal Road Police Department, which contains information on 
all road traffic accidents that were reported to have occurred on federal roads during the 
sample period. Importantly, we observe accidents occurring in a given municipality if 
there is a federal road passing through it, and if the accident is reported to the 
authorities.
12
 Thus, we are likely underestimating the total number of accidents 
occurring in each municipality. However, so long as reporting differences across 
municipalities, if any, are constant across time, our empirical model will account for this 
type of heterogeneity across municipalities.  
A major advantage of this data set is that it contains detailed information on the 
day, time, and location of the accident, as well as the number of injuries involved in 
each crash. We have a total number of 49,945 municipality-day observations for 1,427 
municipalities, 696 of which adopted a ban on alcohol over the sample period. Table 1b 
reports summary statistics for accidents and injuries for several degrees of severity per 
municipality-day. Municipalities that adopted alcohol bans over the study period, on 
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 The results are not sensitive to using narrower or wider time intervals.  
12
 In Brazil, most of the more serious road traffic accidents, especially those involving victims, are 
reported to the federal road police, since police reports are required for insurance claims and may serve as 
important evidence in civil and criminal lawsuits related to the accidents. 
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average, have a lower number of accidents and a lower number injuries resulting from 
accidents per 100,000 persons over the sample period.  
V. Empirical Strategy and Results 
a. Main Results 
As shown in Tables 1a and 1b, for many of the outcomes, we observe only a 
small number of accidents and hospitalizations. Given the nature of the underlying data, 
we estimate models for hospital admission and accident counts using a conditional 
ﬁxed-effects count data model. In particular, we used the Poisson quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (Woolridge, 1999) to estimate the following model:  
                      
             
           ), 
where Ymt is the number of hospitalizations or accidents occurring in municipality m at 
time t;     is the alcohol ban dummy variable, which takes a value of one if an alcohol 
ban is effective for a municipality m at time t (and zero otherwise);        and 
       are indicator variables for a weekday and weekend day, respectively; and µm 
and  t are municipality and calendar day fixed effects, respectively. In our preferred 
specification, we also include linear time trends that are allowed to vary by state, which 
account for state-specific trends in the dependent variable that may, for example, affect 
a state’s decision to impose an alcohol ban on its municipalities. When estimating the 
conditional fixed-effects Poisson regressions, standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level to allow for arbitrary correlation of observations within 
municipalities over time. We present Poisson regression estimates throughout the paper, 
but incidence rate ratios can be obtained by exponentiating regression estimates.  
In Table 2, we show the first set of our main results.
13
 Our analysis indicates 
that, on average, bans on alcohol sales during weekend days reduce acute alcohol-
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 Regression sample sizes are different from the sample sizes shown in the summary statistics because 
municipalities with all-zero outcomes are dropped from the fixed-effect Poisson regression analyses. 
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related hospital admissions by about 10% (Column 1). When we add state-specific 
linear time trends (Column 2), the estimate increases (in absolute magnitude) only 
slightly, revealing that weekend alcohol bans decrease acute alcohol-related 
hospitalizations by about the same amount, as shown in Column 1.  
In contrast, we do not find any evidence indicating that bans on alcohol sales 
during weekdays reduce acute alcohol-related hospitalizations. This is a finding that 
persists throughout the analysis. (To save space, we do not show the estimates of the 
weekday ban dummies, but they are controlled for in regressions throughout the 
analysis.) Weekday bans may have a much smaller effect than weekend bans because 
alcohol consumption is much lower during weekdays, or, because weekday drinkers 
may be very different from weekend drinkers. For instance, it may be the case that 
weekday drinkers are more likely to systematically avoid weekday alcohol bans via 
anticipatory purchases before the ban is effective due to problem drinking habits 
(Vingilis et. al., 2005).  
When we analyze alcohol-related hospitalizations due to several acute causes, 
we find evidence indicating that the estimated reduction in all acute alcohol-related 
hospitalizations is mostly driven by the reduction in hospital admissions associated with 
road traffic accidents. In particular, we find that, on average, weekend alcohol bans 
reduced such hospitalizations by about 18%. Furthermore, while the estimated impact of 
weekend alcohol bans on hospital admissions associated with unintentional injuries is 
economically significant (a reduction of about 8%), the estimates are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. We also find that weekend alcohol bans have a small 
negative effect on hospitalizations associated with assaults (a reduction of about 1%), 
but the coefficients in these regressions are very imprecisely estimated.  
14
The results in Table 2 suggest that weekend alcohol bans reduced hospital 
admissions associated with road traffic accidents by reducing excessive alcohol 
consumption. To shed more light on this finding, we now turn to an analysis of the 
impact of alcohol bans on road traffic accidents to further investigate the relationship 
between alcohol bans and drunk driving. Table 3 contains our second set of main 
results. Similar to the results shown in Table 2, we find strong evidence indicating that 
bans on the sale of alcohol during weekends reduce both road crashes and the injuries 
resulting from them. In particular, focusing on specifications that include state-specific 
linear time trends (Column 2), we estimate that, on average, weekend alcohol bans 
reduce road crashes by about 15%, reduce light injuries by about 31%, reduce serious 
injuries by about 35%, and reduce fatal injuries by about 68%. When we do not 
differentiate between the injuries, we estimate that, on average, weekend alcohol bans 
reduce all traffic-related injuries by about 36%.  
These results provide an extra source of validation to the results shown in Table 
2. We, therefore, find strong evidence suggesting that the reductions in hospital 
admissions due to road traffic accidents are driven by the fact that such alcohol bans 
reduce excessive alcohol consumption which, in turn, decreases drunk driving, road 
crashes, and traffic-related injuries.  
Overall, we find that the effects of dry laws on public health outcomes are both 
statistically and economically significant. One week before the elections, in the period 
between September 23rd and September 29
th
 2012, there were, on average, a total of 
206 hospitalizations due to road crashes per day in the 2,733 municipalities that 
implemented Election Day alcohol bans. Our results imply that about 37 
hospitalizations due to road traffic accidents were prevented as a result of the adoption 
of a single-day ban on alcohol sales. Over the same time period there were, on average, 
15
a total of 77 light, 35 serious, and 12 fatal traffic-related injuries. Thus, we further 
estimate that around 24 light injuries, 12 serious injuries, and 8 fatalities resulting from 
traffic accidents on federal roads were averted as a result of a one-day ban on alcohol 
sales. In the cost analysis below, we provide a more detailed analysis of the magnitudes 
of the policy’s effects on public health outcomes.  
In Table 4, we subject our analysis to further scrutiny through several robustness 
and sensitivity checks. As shown in Table 1a, municipalities that banned alcohol during 
the elections were more likely than other municipalities to be given federal troops for 
the elections. This raises the concern that the presence of extra police in a 
municipality—and not a short-term restriction on the availability of alcohol—accounts 
for the decline in both hospitalizations and injuries resulting from road traffic accidents. 
As we show in Row 1, controlling for the presence of extra troops on Election Day 
barely changes the regression coefficients (compare Row 1 of Table 4 to Column 2 of 
Tables 2 and 3). Thus, the fact that there was more policing in municipalities that 
banned alcohol—which was likely concentrated in select areas with election polls—
does not explain our results.  
Because municipalities that banned alcohol differ from those that did not, in 
terms of income, population size, and literacy, we investigated whether our estimates 
are sensitive to changes in the composition of the control group. We re-run our main 
specification excluding from the sample all control municipalities that have above 
median income per capita (Row 2), below median percentage of rural population (Row 
3), above median literacy rates (Row 4) and above median population size (Row 5). 
Observe that our results are very robust to changes in the estimation sample, so non-
comparability between treatment and control groups does not seem to be an issue here. 
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Throughout our analysis, we distinguished between weekday and weekend bans. 
In Row 6, we, instead, use a single policy variable that is weighted by the fraction of 
hours that the alcohol ban was in effect on a particular day. The estimates indicate that a 
full-day ban reduces traffic-related hospitalizations by about 18% and reduces all 
traffic-related injuries by about 40%. The former estimate is of the same magnitude as 
the one shown in Table 2, and the latter estimate is only slightly larger than the one we 
presented in Table 3.  
We have been estimating Poisson regression models throughout the analysis but, 
as shown in Row 7, our results are not sensitive to changing the estimation method. The 
estimates delivered from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) also indicate a substantial 
reduction in traffic-related hospitalizations and injuries, relative to the estimation 
sample means.
14
 The OLS estimates are, however, larger than the incidence rate ratios 
that we obtained from the Poisson regression. We do not place too much weight on this 
difference given that Poisson regression models are more appropriate for count data 
than are OLS models.  
Lastly, we perform a placebo test. Given the short-term nature of the alcohol 
bans, we would expect that the impact on alcohol-related hospitalizations due to chronic 
causes (e.g. cirrhosis of the liver) is much smaller than the impact on acute causes, if not 
zero. Indeed, in Row 8, we find no evidence indicating that alcohol bans had an effect 
on chronic alcohol-related hospitalizations. This adds credibility to the estimates of the 
effect of alcohol bans on hospitalizations due to acute causes that we find in our main 
analysis.  
b. Heterogeneity 
Our results indicate that excessive alcohol consumption imposes substantial  
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 The estimation sample mean for the counts of traffic-related hospitalizations is 0.182 and the 
corresponding mean for all traffic-related injuries is 0.256. 
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negative externalities on society, based on strong evidence that bans on alcohol sales 
during weekends result in large reductions in traffic-related hospital admissions, road 
crashes, and traffic-related injuries. It is important to know who contributes most to 
alcohol-attributable negative externalities in order to help shape well-designed policies 
aimed at reducing them. There is evidence in the literature indicating that, in Brazil, 
excessive alcohol consumption is a problem of males and, in particular, young males 
(e.g. Bacchieri and Barros, 2011). In the hospitalization files, we find evidence that is 
suggestive of this as well. In particular, in Figures 1a and 1b, we plot the total daily 
count of hospital admissions associated with road traffic accidents across all of the 
Brazilian states in our sample, by age, for males and females. Most hospitalizations due 
to road traffic accidents involve individuals aged 18-44. While we find a similar pattern 
for both males and females, the count for the former is generally much higher across the 
age distribution.  
In order to examine the distribution of the morbidity impact of alcohol bans, we 
exploit the richness of the hospitalization data by analyzing the impact of alcohol bans 
on traffic-related hospitalizations, by age group and sex. The results from this analysis 
are contained in Table 5. We find that the impact of weekend alcohol bans is 
concentrated among males. The estimates for females are generally smaller than the 
corresponding ones for males, and are always statistically insignificant. We estimate 
that, on average, bans on the sale of alcohol during weekends reduce traffic-related 
hospitalizations among males by about 21%, which is almost four times the size of the 
estimated impact we find for females (compare Panel A to Panel B in column 1).  
In an analysis of the impact by gender and age groups (17 and under, 18-44, and 
45+), we further find evidence indicating that the impact is concentrated among young 
males. In particular, we estimate that, on average, weekend alcohol bans reduce traffic-
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related hospitalizations among males in these age groups by 40%, 19%, and 8%, 
respectively. However, only the first two estimates are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. We can never reject the null hypothesis that alcohol bans have a 
zero effect on the hospitalizations of females, irrespective of the age group.   
In sum, the heterogeneity analysis indicates that the morbidity impact of alcohol 
bans is concentrated among young males. This finding is consistent with the alcohol 
consumption patterns in Brazil, i.e. that young males are the most likely to engage in 
excessive drinking. It is also consistent with the wealth of evidence in the literature 
discussed above, which is based on data from many countries, that alcohol-related 
policies have much larger effects on males than on females.  
c. Dynamics 
We also examine the dynamics involved in the policy’s implementation and the  
resulting improvements in traffic-related outcomes. In particular, we examine whether 
there is evidence of anticipatory and lagged effects of alcohol bans. Given the short-
term nature of the policy individuals may, for example, increase their consumption of 
alcohol before an alcohol ban takes effect, and immediately after the ban is lifted.  
 In the analysis of the hospitalization data, we focus on estimating three-day 
leaded and lagged effects of the bans that occurred over the weekend. Figure 2 
summarizes the results of our analysis. We find that the reduction in hospital admissions 
associated with road traffic accidents is concentrated in the period when the ban was 
effective, which in all cases, include Election Day. In particular, we estimate that, on 
average, bans on alcohol sales contemporaneously reduce traffic-related hospitalizations 
by about 19%, which is very close to the estimate in our preferred specification in 
column 2 of Table 2. In contrast, the estimated effects of the leads are much smaller and 
are all statistically insignificant. A test of joint significance indicates that we cannot 
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reject the null hypothesis that the leads are jointly equal to zero (p-value 0.762). 
Interestingly, the figure also shows that there is a small increase in traffic-related 
hospital admissions on the day after the ban is lifted. However, the lagged estimated 
effects are all smaller in absolute value than the contemporaneous effect, are all 
statistically insignificant, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the lags are 
jointly equal to zero (p-value 0.530).   
 We conducted an analogous analysis with the road traffic accident data but, in 
this case, we estimate three separate four-hour-time-blocks before and after the time 
block of the weekend ban. Note that we focus here on a narrower time period than we 
did previously, namely, the day before and after Election Day. Similar to the evidence 
shown in Figure 2, the evidence summarized in Figure 3 indicates that the improvement 
in traffic outcomes caused by weekend bans is concentrated during the time of the ban. 
We estimate that, on average, the ban reduces traffic accidents by about 7% during the 
time block when it is effective. Tests of joints significance of the leads (p-value 0.968) 
and lags (p-value 0.204) indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
policy had zero anticipatory and lagged effects on road crashes. 
 In sum, the evidence in Figures 2 and 3 is consistent with the analysis shown 
previously, which focused on the contemporaneous effects of alcohol bans on road 
crashes and traffic-related hospital admissions. Bans on the sale of alcohol on Election 
Day were effective in reducing the negative externalities caused by excessive alcohol 
consumption, as measured by a lower number of road crashes and traffic-related 
hospitalizations. However, there is also some weak suggestive evidence of a perverse 
effect of the policy: traffic-related outcomes seem to worsen in municipalities that had 
an alcohol ban relative to other municipalities after the ban is lifted. This may be due to 
the fact that individuals engage in over-consumption of alcohol once it is available for 
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purchase. This seems to be a plausible explanation, especially considering that the bans 
were lifted, in most cases, on Sunday evening, around 6pm, which is a period where 
individuals typically go out to socialize and drink. A staggered ban-lifting process may 
help to alleviate this perverse effect of the policy.   
d. Cost Analysis 
The richness of the hospitalization files allows us to quantify the negative 
externality imposed on society caused by excessive alcohol consumption. In particular, 
we have information on the total cost of each hospitalization, which enables us to 
analyze the healthcare cost savings associated with the reduction in traffic-related 
hospitalizations caused by bans on alcohol sales. We also observe the length of hospital 
stays, which we use as an alternative way to assess the cost savings. Unfortunately, 
however, we are unable to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of Election 
Day alcohol bans because it is difficult to measure the loss in revenue for all of the 
establishments that are affected by this policy, e.g. bars, restaurants, supermarkets, etc. 
Because of the nature of the cost and length of hospital stay data and the fact that 
we observe relatively few hospital admissions due to road traffic accidents across the 
municipality-days in our sample, we used a Tobit model for this part of the analysis. 
The results from this analysis are contained in Table 6. We estimate that, on average, 
weekend bans reduce traffic-related hospitalization costs by about $50 and reduce the 
length of hospital stays by about one-third of a day.
19
 Relative to the estimation sample 
means, these reductions are substantial: alcohol bans reduce the costs associated with 
traffic-related hospital admissions by about 40%, and the corresponding reduction for 
hospital stays is about 26%. To get a better sense of the cost savings for the healthcare 
system in Brazil, recall that 2,733 municipalities banned alcohol sales on Election Day. 
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 These estimates are based calculating the marginal effects on the expected value of the truncated 
outcome.   
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Thus, a one-day ban on alcohol sales saved municipalities approximately $150,000 in 
terms of healthcare expenditures.  
While the magnitude of this estimate may be viewed as small in magnitude, it 
should be emphasized that the present analysis only takes into account the cost savings 
associated with hospitalization expenditure. In fact, the economic costs of traffic 
accidents also include losses in productivity due to temporary or permanent 
incapacitation, monetary damages to vehicles and other properties, costs of ambulatory 
care and post-hospitalization medical treatments, etc. Indeed, according to the Institute 
of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)—an important government think-tank in 
Brazil—hospitalization costs account for between 13% and 32% of the economic costs 
of road traffic accidents (IPEA 2003, 2006). Using our estimate of $150,000 as a 
benchmark, this implies that the total cost savings may be on the order of $460,000-
$1,150,000 for a single day. 
An alternative way to assess the magnitude of the policy’s effect on public 
health is to value the lives saved as a result of the alcohol ban. Above, we indicated that 
our estimates imply that a one-day alcohol ban prevented a total of 8 fatalities resulting 
from traffic accidents on federal roads. A recent study using data from São Paulo 
estimated that the Value of a Statistical Life-Year (VSLY) ranges between $61,392 and 
$159,456 (Ortiz et al., 2009). Thus, using this VSLY range, the 8 fatalities prevented by 
the Election Day alcohol ban may be valued at between $491,136 and $1,275,648 for 
each additional year lived.  
The electoral dry laws may also generate other potential social benefits, such as 
a reduction in crime (Carpenter 2005; Biderman et al. 2010; Heaton 2012; Grönqvist 
and Niknami 2014) and suicide rates (Birckmayer and Hemenway 1999; Ramstedt 
2001). It is important to note, however, that alcohol bans reduce consumer surplus by 
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preventing individuals from drinking in public places, although drinking privately was 
still allowed. The policy also caused a decrease in alcohol-related revenue of 
commercial establishments and a reduction in the amount of alcohol-related taxes raised 
by the federal government. However, these losses in revenue do not necessarily 
represent a decrease in economic welfare, since money not spent on alcohol may be 
directed towards other products sold by the establishments affected by the law.  
Our analysis shows that the negative externalities associated with alcohol 
consumption are substantial, implying that government policies that restrict the 
availability of alcoholic beverages may be justified in some situations. While the 
present study does not allow us to conclude that this type of policy would lead to similar 
cost savings if it was implemented for longer periods of time, it is likely that short-term 
alcohol bans could be successfully adopted during certain special events and holidays, 
when large numbers of people are expected to be driving from one place to another and 
traffic congestion is expected to be problematic. Alcohol bans may also be useful to 
reduce risk of violent outbreaks associated with sporting events. For example, several 
jurisdictions in Colombia banned the sale of alcohol in response to reports of injuries 
and killings resulting from World-Cup-related victory celebrations.
20
 
From a policy perspective, it is useful to apply our estimates to an important 
historic event during which the sale of alcohol was expected to be—but was ultimately 
not—banned in Brazil. To reduce the risk of violence during football games, the 
Brazilian government has prohibited the sale of alcohol in football stadiums since 2003 
and it, initially, decided that the sale of alcohol would be banned in stadiums during the 
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 Medina, O and Jenkins, C. 2014. “World Cup Spurs Booze Ban Across Colombia as Deaths Rise.” 
Bloomberg, June 25. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-24/world-cup-spurs-booze-ban-across-
colombia-as-deaths-rise.html. 
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2014 World Cup games.
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 A fiery debate between Brazilian authorities and the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) ensued. In the end, the alcohol 
ban was lifted, in large part because Budweiser’s producer, Anheuser-Busch InBev, is 
one of FIFA’s main sponsors and beer is deemed to be an important part of fan culture 
and World Cup tradition. If the ban on alcohol sales had been in place on each of the 25 
days of the World Cup games in every municipality in Brazil, our estimates suggest that 
the cost savings for the Brazilian healthcare system could have amounted to $7 million 
($50*5,570*25), or $280,000 per World Cup game day. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the impacts on public health of a short-term ban on  
alcohol sales in a large number of municipalities in Brazil during the 2012 Municipal 
Elections. Our analysis indicates that Election Day bans substantially reduced road 
crashes, traffic-related injuries, and traffic-related hospital admissions. The evidence in 
this study indicates that Election Day alcohol bans which, in most cases, lasted for only 
a fraction of a day led to economically important unintended cost savings for Brazil’s 
healthcare system, as measured by the reduction in costs associated with traffic-related 
hospitalizations.  
We estimate that, on average, a one-day ban on alcohol caused costs associated 
with traffic-related hospital admissions to fall by about $50 (or a decrease of about 40% 
relative to the sample mean), which amounts to $150,000 when the cost is summed over 
all the municipalities that banned alcohol sales during the elections. Our results indicate 
that banning alcohol may serve as an important policy tool to reduce the negative 
externality imposed on a nation’s healthcare system. Given the potential for 
compensatory health-reducing behavior to be a perverse product of many policies, this 
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intervention may be best utilized on days of the year when many individuals are likely 
to consume alcohol and drive nontrivial distances because they are not at work, such as 
in the case of special events, holidays, and elections. 
 While we in no way recommend a prohibition on alcohol, we do believe that our 
results have important implications for policymakers in areas where excessive alcohol 
consumption and risky driving behavior are especially problematic. This is certainly 
applicable to the case of Brazil, where traffic fatalities rank among the top causes of 
death, particularly among young men. Excessive alcohol consumption also raises the 
potential for aggression and violence. Bans on the sale and purchase of alcohol were 
recently implemented by Colombia during its Congressional Elections and World Cup 
games in order to decrease public drunkenness and violent behavior. Similar policies 
might be useful in reducing the social cost associated with hosting large sporting events, 
such as in the case of Rio de Janeiro for the 2016 Summer Olympics.  
  
25
VII. References 
Adda, J and Cornaglia, F. (2010). “The Effect of Bans and Taxes on Passive Smoking.” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1): 1-32. 
Akgür, S. A., H. Ertas, A. E. Altntoprak, M. Ozkan and G. Kitapcoglu. (2011). 
“Prevalence of Alcohol in Blood Samples from Traffic Accident Cases in Turkey.” Am. 
J. Forensic Med. Pathol., 32(2): 136-9. 
Bacchieri, G. and A.J.D. Barros. (2011). “Traffic accidents in Brazil from 1998 to 2010: 
many changes and few effects.” Revista de Saúde Pública, 45(5): 1-14.  
Baughman, R., Conlin, M, Dicket-Conlin, S., and Pepper, J. (2001). “Slippery when 
wet: the effects of local alcohol access laws on highway safety.” Journal of Health 
Economics, 20(6): 1089-1096. 
Biderman, C., J.M.P. De Mello and A. Schneider. (2009). “Dry Laws and Homicides: 
Evidence From the São Paulo Metropolitan Area.” Economic Journal, 120(March): 
157-182. 
Birckmayer, J. and D. Hemenway. (1999). “Minimum-age Drinking Laws and Youth 
Suicide, 1970-1990.” American Journal of Public Health, 89(9): 1365-68. 
Breitmeier, D., I. Seeland-Schulze, H. Hecker and U. Schneider. (2007). “The Influence 
of Blood Alcohol Concentrations of around 0.03% on Neuropsychological Functions – 
A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Investigation.” Addict Biol., June 12(2): 183-9.  
Carpenter, C. S. (2005). “Heavy Alcohol Use and the Commission of Nuisance Crime: 
Evidence from Underage Drunk Driving Laws.” American Economic Review, 95(2): 
267-72. 
Carpenter, C. S. and C. Dobkin. (2009). “The Effect of Alcohol Consumption on 
Mortality: Regression Disontinuity Evidence From the Minimum Drinking Age.” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(10): 164-82. 
Christophersen, A. S., K. M. Beylich, A. Bjorneboe, S. Fosser, A. Glad and J. Morland. 
(1995). “Prevalence of Alcohol and Drugs in Blod Samples from Norwegian Drivers 
Involved in Road Traffic Accidents.” In: Kloeden, C. N. and A. J. McLean eds. 
26
Proceedings of the 13
th
 International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety, 
Adelaide, Australia. 
Conover, E. and D. Scrimgeour. (2013). “Health Consequences of Easier Access to 
Alcohol: New Zealand Evidence”. Journal of Health Economics, 32(2): 570-85. 
Dee, T.S. (1999). “State alcohol policies, teen drinking and traffic fatalities.” Journal of 
Public Economics, 72(2): 289-315.   
Galduróz, J.C.F., and Caetano, R. (2004). “Epidemiology of Alcohol Use in Brazil.” 
Revista Brasileira de Psiquiatria, 26(Supl): 3-6.  
Green, CP, Heywood, JS, and Navarro, M. (2014). “Did liberalising bar hours decrease 
traffic accidents?” Journal of Health Economics, 35(May): 189-198.   
Grönqvist, H. And Niknami, S. (2014). “Alcohol availability and crime: Lessons from 
liberalized weekend sales restrictions.” Journal of Urban Economics, 81(May): 77-84 
Heaton, P. (2012). “Sunday Liquor Laws and Crime”. Journal of Public Economics, 96: 
42-52. 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada. (2003). “Impactos Sociais e Econômicos 
dos Acidentes de Trânsito nas Aglomerações Urbanas.” 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada. (2006). “Impactos Sociais e Econômicos 
dos Acidentes de Trânsito nas Rodovias Brasileiras.” 
Jacobs, G., Aaron-Thomas, A., and Astrop, A. (2000). “Estimating Global Road 
Fatalities.” Research Report No. 445. London: London Transport Research Laboratory.  
Jewell, R.T. and Brown, R.W. (1995). “Alcohol availability and alcohol-related motor 
vehicle accidents.” Applied Economics, 27(8): 759-765.  
Levitt, S.D. and Porter, J. (2001). “How Dangerous are Drinking Drivers?” Journal of 
Political Economy, 109(6): 1198-1237. 
Lovenheim, M. and D. Steefel. (2011). “Do Blue Laws Save Lives? The Effect of 
Sunday Alcohol Sales Bans on Fatal Vehicle Accidents.” Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management, 30(4): 798-820. 
27
Marcus, J. and T. Siedler. (2013). “Reducing Binge Drinking? The Effect of a Ban on 
Late-night Off-premises Alcohol Sales on Alcohol-Related Hospital Stays in German.” 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und 
Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Health Economics, No. 
G07-V1. 
McMillan, G and Lapham, S. (2006) “Legalized Sunday Packaged Sales and Alcohol-
Related Traffic Crashes and Crash Fatalities in New Mexico.” American Journal of 
Public Health, 96(11): 1944-8.  
Norström, T. and O.-J. Skog. (2005). “Saturday opening of alcohol retail shops in 
Sweden: An Experiment in Two Phases”. Addiction, 100(6): 767-76. 
Ortiz, R.A., Markandya, A., and Hunt, A. (2009). “Willingness to pay for mortality risk 
reduction associated with air pollution in São Paulo.” Revista Brasileira de Economia, 
63 (1): 3-22.  
Phillip, D. P. and K. M. Brewer. (2011). “The Relationship between Serious Injury and 
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) in Fatal Motor Vehicle Accidents: BAC=0.01% is 
Associated with Significantly More Dangerous Accidents than BAC=0.00%.” 
Addiction, 106(9): 1614-22. 
Ragnarsdóttir, P., A. Kjartansdóttir and S. Daviosdóttir. (2002). “Effect of Alcohol 
Serving Hours in Reykjavik.” In The Effects of Nordic Alcohol Policies: What Happens 
to Drinking and Harm When Alcohol Controls Change? (R. Room, ed.), NAD 
Publications, N
o
 42: Helsink, Finland, pp. 145-54.  
Ramstedt, M. (2001). “Alcohol and Suicide in 14 European Countries.” Addiction, 
96(1s1): 59-75. 
Ruhm, C. (1996). “Alcohol Policies and Highway Vehicle Fatalities.” Journal of Health 
Economics, 15(4): 435-454.  
Smith, I. “Effectiveness of Legislative and Fiscal Restrictions in Reducing Alcohol 
Related Crime and Traffic Accidents.” Proc., AIC: Alcohol and Crime Conference.  
28
Sivak, M., and Schoettle, B. (2014). “Mortality from Road Crashes in 193 Countries: A 
Comparison with Other Leading Causes of Death.” Working paper, University of 
Michigan, Transportation Research Institute, Michigan, USA.  
Stehr, MF. (2010). “The Effect of Sunday Sales of Alcohol on Highway Crash 
Fatalities.” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1): 1935-1682, 
Vingilis, E. (2007). “Limits of Hours of Sales and Service: Effects on Traffic Society”. 
Transportation Research Circular, E-C123: 120-29. 
Vingilis, E., A. I. McLeod, J. Seeley, R. E. Mann, D. Beirness and C. P. Comption. 
(2005). “Road Safety Impact of Extended Drinking Hours in Ontario”. Accident 
Analysis and Prevention, 37(3): 549-56. 
World Health Organization. (2013). “Global Status Report on Road Safety: Supporting 
a Decade of Action.” 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (1999). “Distribution-free estimation of some nonlinear panel 
data models.” Journal of Econometrics, 90(May): 77-97.  
 
29
Municipality-Level Information Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Total Population (2010) 34,278 203,113 28,325 105,056 44,999 306,902
Percent Rural Population (2010) 36.174 22.041 38.595 20.365 33.673 24.703
Percent Male Population (2010) 50.496 1.569 50.374 1.312 50.381 1.801
Literacy Rate (Aged 15 and Over) (2000) 78.230 12.460 73.686 12.264 85.155 9.940
Income per Capita (2000) 170.814 96.425 135.364 75.502 224.569 103.317
1 if Federal Troops Given for the 2012 Municipal Elections 0.071 0.126 0.004
Sistema de Informações Hospitalares Hospitalization Files
"Acute" Alcohol-Related Hospitalizationsa 1.018 4.017 0.903 3.564 1.175 4.561
Hospitalizations due to Road Traffic Accidentsa 0.242 1.872 0.264 1.949 0.212 1.762
Hospitalizations due to Unintentional Injuriesa 0.727 3.460 0.603 2.895 0.897 4.104
Hospitalizations due to Assaultsa 0.042 0.761 0.027 0.607 0.063 0.931
"Chronic" Alcohol-Related Hospitalizationsa 0.477 2.971 0.396 2.595 0.588 3.416
Total Hospitalizationsa 17.415 18.831 16.407 17.677 18.797 20.225
Sample Size
Note: Our sample constists of hospitalizations that occurred in the 17 states that imposed on its municipalities a state-level decision to ban alcohol on election day. We
exclude information from the 9 states that decentralized the decision to ban alcohol on election day to its municipalities. The unit of observation is a municipality-calendar 
day. a These are hospitalization rates per 100,000 persons in the municipality.  
N = 2,733 N = 1,995N = 4,728
All Municipalities
165,480 95,655 69,825
Table 1a: Sample Summary Statistics for Baseline Socioeconomic Information and Hospital Admissions
Alcohol Ban Implemented Over Sample Period
Yes No
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Federal Road Police Department Files
Accidentsa 1.209 5.206 1.076 4.047 1.336 6.105
Light Injuries Resulting from Accidenta 0.560 4.582 0.486 3.768 0.630 5.239
Serious Injuries Resulting from Accidenta 0.233 2.845 0.216 1.969 0.248 3.479
Fatal Injuries Resulting from Accidenta 0.085 1.410 0.074 1.257 0.095 1.541
All Injuries Resulting from Accidenta 0.877 6.460 0.776 5.030 0.973 7.572
Sample Size
Note: Our sample constists of accidents that occurred on Federal Roads in the municipalities of the 17 states that imposed on its municipalities a state-level decision to 
ban alcohol on election day. We exclude information from the 9 states that decentralized the decision to ban alcohol on election day to its municipalities. The unit of 
observation is a munipality-calendar day. However, note that we observe an accident only if it is reported by the authorities. a These are rates per 100,000 persons in the 
municipality.
 
Table 1b: Sample Summary Statistics for Road Traffic Accidents
All Municipalities Alcohol Ban Implemented Over Sample Period
Yes No
N = 1,427 N = 696 N = 731
49,945 24,360 25,585
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(1) (2)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekday Ban on Alcohol 0.095 0.087
(0.076) (0.077)
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.100* -0.102*
(0.055) (0.056)
Dep Var
     
1 if Munic Implemented Weekday Ban on Alcohol 0.142 0.108
(0.135) (0.134)
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.193** -0.202**
(0.083) (0.083)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekday Ban on Alcohol -0.053 -0.049
(0.106) (0.104)
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.088 -0.088
(0.072) (0.073)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekday Ban on Alcohol 0.130 0.028
(0.737) (0.755)
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.019 -0.014
(0.260) (0.257)
Municipality and Calendar Day Fixed Effects x x
State Dummies × Linear Time Trend x
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and are in parentheses below poisson regression 
coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 2: The Effect of Alcohol Bans on Acute Alcohol-Related Hospital Admissions
N = 25,830
N = 122,115
N = 79,870
N = 138,565
Assaults
Unintentional Injuries
Road Traffic Accidents
All Acute Alcohol-Related
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(1) (2)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.175* -0.168*
(0.100) (0.099)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.381** -0.376**
(0.165) (0.165)
Dep Var
     
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.428* -0.432*
(0.249) (0.251)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -1.091** -1.143***
(0.435) (0.438)
Dep Var
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.438*** -0.439***
(0.142) (0.142)
Municipality and Calendar Day Fixed Effects x x
State Dummies × Linear Time Trend x
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and are in parentheses below poisson regression 
coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Fatal Injuries
N = 16,975
N = 43,155
All Injuries
Serious Injuries
N = 28,385
Table 3: The Effect of Alcohol Bans on Road Crashes and Traffic-Related Injuries
Road Traffic Accidents
N = 49,910
Light Injuries
N = 37,695
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(1) (2)
Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
(1) Addressing the Issue of Extra Policing Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
N = 79,870 N = 43,155
1 if Munic Had Extra Federal Troops Present 0.110 0.229
(0.208) (0.273)
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.206** -0.443***
(0.083) (0.142)
Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
(2) Drop High Income Control Municipalities Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
 N = 68,110 N = 37,100
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.258*** -0.393** 
(0.097) (0.166)
Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
(3) Drop Low Rural Pop Control Municipalities Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
N = 72,625 N = 39,760
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.191** -0.439***
(0.097) (0.157)
Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
(4) Drop High Literacy Control Municipalities Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
N = 69,650 N = 37,170
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.219** -0.352** 
(0.102) (0.163)
Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
(5) Drop High Pop Control Municipalities Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
N = 56,315 N = 26,775
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.240* -0.377
(0.132) (0.262)
(6) Alternative Coding of Policy Variable Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
 N = 79,870  N = 43,155
Munic Implemented Ban on Alcohol -0.197* -0.513** 
(Weighted by Hours the Ban was in Effect ) (0.106) (0.241)
Table 4: Robustness Checks
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(1) (2)
Hospitalizations due to All Injuries Resulting from
(7) Ordinary Least Squares Road Traffic Accidents Road Traffic Accidents
 N = 79,870  N = 43,155
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.062*** -0.135***
(0.023) (0.041)
(8) Placebo Regression
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol
Municipality and Calendar Day Fixed Effects x x
State Dummies × Linear Time Trend x x
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level unless otherwise specified, and are below
poisson regression coefficients. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
-0.059
(0.097)
N = 106,085
Table 4 (Continued): Robustness Checks
All Chronic Alcohol-Related Hospitalizations
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var
Panel A: Males All Aged 17 and Under Aged 18-44 Aged 45+
N = 72,520 N = 23,135 N = 59,395 N = 29,155
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.235*** -0.511** -0.209* -0.086
(0.090) (0.248) (0.119) (0.188)
Panel B: Females All Aged 17 and Under Aged 18-44 Aged 45+
N = 34,650 N =  11,830 N = 22,330 N = 15,120
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.067 -0.165 0.071 -0.143
(0.196) (0.376) (0.243) (0.345)
Municipality and Calendar Day Fixed Effects x x x x
State Dummies × Linear Time Trend x x x x
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level, and are in parentheses below poisson coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% level, and 1% level, respectively.
 
Table 5: The Heterogenous Effects of Alcohol Bans on Hospitalizations due to Road Traffic Accidents by Age Group and Sex
Hospitalizations due to Road Traffic Accidents
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Dep Var Hospitalization Costs
Sample Mean  = 123.974
N = 79,870
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -49.479**
(21.614)
Dep Var Length of Hospital Stay
Sample Mean  = 1.164
N = 79,870
     
1 if Munic Implemented Weekend Ban on Alcohol -0.305*
(0.180)
Municipality and Calendar Day Fixed Effects x
State Dummies × Calendar Day x
Note: The Tobit model estimates shown are estimated marginal effects on the expected value of the truncated outcome. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level, and are in parentheses below the estimated marginal effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 6: The Effect of Alcohol Bans on Hospitalization Costs and Length of Hospital Stay due to Road Traffic Accidents
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Figure 1a: Daily Count of Hospitalizations due to Road Traffic Accidents (Males) 
 
 
Figure 1b: Daily Count of Hospitalizations due to Road Traffic Accidents (Females) 
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 Note: The dependent variable is the number of hospitalizations due to road traffic accidents. The analysis here 
uses the full sample of data, as we did in Table 2; the specification is also the same as in Table 2. “C” 
corresponds to the day of the weekend ban, and “Fi” and “Li” correspond to the ith day before and after the ban, 
respectively. The dot is the Poisson regression coefficient estimate and the lines correspond to the 95% 
confidence band.  
 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of road traffic accidents. The analysis here uses data from October 
6
th
 to October 8
th
; the specification is the same as in Table 3, except that here we include calendar day-hour 
dummies instead of calendar day dummies. “C” corresponds to the full time block of the weekend ban, and “Fi” 
and “Li” correspond to the ith 4-hour time block before and after the ban, respectively. The dot is the Poisson 
regression coefficient estimate and the lines correspond to the 95% confidence band. 
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Figure 2: When Does the Impact on Hospital Admissions Occur?
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Figure 3: When Does the Impact on Accidents Occur?
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States
Adopted Alcohol Bans
Amazonas (AM), Ceará (CE), Maranhão (MA), Minas Gerais (MG), 
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), Pará (PA), Paraíba (PB), Pernambuco (PE), 
Piauí (PI), Paraná (PR) and Rio Grande do Norte (RN).
Did Not Adopt Alcohol Bans Bahia (BA), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Rondônia (RO), Rio Grande do Sul (RS), Santa Catarina (SC) and São Paulo (SP).
Decentralized the Decision to Municipalities Acre (AC), Alagoas (AL), Amapa (AP), Espirito Santo (ES), Goias (GO), Mato Grosso (MT), Roraima (RO), Sergipe (SE) and Tocantins (TO).
Appendix Table 1a: List of States by Alcohol Ban Status during the 2012 Municipal Elections
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State Oct 2            Tuesday
Oct 3 
Wednesday
Oct 4      
Thursday
Oct 5          
Friday
Oct 6         
Saturday
Oct 7         
Sunday
Oct 8               
Monday
Election Day
Amazonas 0 0 0 0 1  (8.3%) 1  (75%) 0
Bahia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ceará 0 0 0 0 0 1  (75%) 0
Maranhão 1  (8.3%) 1  (33.3%) 1  (33.3%) 1  (33.3%) 1  (100%) 1  (100%) 1  (100%)
Minas Gerais 0 0 0 0 0 1  (50%) 0
Mato Grosso do Sul 0 0 0 0 0 1  (75%) 0
Pará 0 0 0 0 0 1  (75%) 0
Paraíba 0 0 0 0 0 1  (75%) 0
Pernambuco 0 0 0 0 0 1  (50%) 0
Piauí 0 0 0 0 1  (8.3%) 1  (75%) 0
Paraná 0 0 0 0 0 1  (50%) 0
Rio de Janeiro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rio Grande do Norte 0 0 0 0 0 1  (50%) 0
Rondônia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rio Grande do Sul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Santa Catarina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
São Paulo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alcohol Ban Dummy  (Fraction of Day the Ban was in Effect)
Appendix 1b: The Timing of Alchol bans across Brazilian States during the 2012 Municipal Elections
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